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THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT SURETY AND SOME
SURETYSHIP DEFENSES
T. SCOTT LEO*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article briefly examines some of the principles that serve to
protect the surety's unique role in construction contracts. Instru-
ments of suretyship can secure the obligation to perform any type
of contract. A construction contract is perhaps the most distinct
type of obligation sureties bond.1
Construction contracts, negotiable instruments, and payment
obligations such as notes are vastly different obligations. Arriving
at rules that are consistent and take into account the economic re-
alities of very different underlying obligations is one of the formi-
dable challenges facing the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of
Suretyship. The Restatement should define principles that govern
both the surety securing a negotiable instrument or other obliga-
tion to pay and the surety securing performance of the construc-
tion contract. Economic or practical sense, however, should not fall
sacrifice to the desire for consistency.
The underlying obligation secured by the surety bond may be
subject to differing policy considerations. Negotiability has never
been a policy fostered in the world of construction contracts. On
* Attorney, McNeela & Griffin, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois. B.A., University of Illinois, 1976;
J.D., Washington University, 1980. Member, Board of Advisers, Restatement (Third) of
Suretyship.
1. Endorsers and guarantors are described as sureties in the RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY
§ 28 cmts. g, k (1941). Such obligations are suretyship obligations as defined in § 1 of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SuRErsHIP § 1 cmts. c-d (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992). One of the
goals of this Article is to discuss the rules that ought to apply to construction contract
sureties in light of the nature of the underlying obligation secured by the surety. The pri-
mary focus will be upon the obligations and rights of the performance-bond surety, some-
times called "contract surety" or "construction contract surety" with respect to construction
contracts.
The Restatement of Suretyship uses the terms "principal obligor," "secondary obligor,"
and "obligee" or "creditor" in describing the parties to a suretyship obligation or instru-
ment. Id. at xv. In this Article, I use the terms "principal," "surety," and "obligee" because
they are used in surety practice.
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the contrary, the expectation of the construction bond surety is
that the contract will be performed by the contractor/principal for
a particular obligee. Although construction contracts are assigna-
ble, as are other contracts, given the nature and risks of the tasks
to be performed under a construction contract, a change in parties
as a practical matter nearly always entails a change in the risk of
the endeavor.
A note or negotiable instrument may involve a number of pay-
ments over an extended period of time, but unlike a negotiable in-
strument, a construction contract is an agreement to participate in
a creative process. That process may take place over an extended
period of time and involve a number of unique, nonuniform tasks.
It may also require a certain level of expertise and experience and
be subject to the strictures of the unique financing arrangements
typical of construction.
A guaranty might relate to a discrete instrument or note setting
forth the precise terms for payment. Although all drafters strive to
define precisely the obligations in the written contract, a construc-
tion contract, unlike a promissory note, cannot succinctly define
the obligations of the parties. In large measure, this is because of
the nature of the obligations to be performed. Construction, like
medicine, is not the precise science that laymen believe it to be.
Rather, it is fraught with uncertainty. During the course of the
performance of the construction contract, there may be numerous
changes or change orders that will determine the scope of the tasks
to be performed. Physical conditions, the interaction of trades, or
modifications of design may cause these changes. A good construc-
tion manager brings together the skills of the business manager,
social scientist, engineer, and politician. There is more artistry
than science in blending these skills to achieve the desired result.
Unquestionably, even the simplest construction contract con-
templates skill on the part of the contractor. Moreover, every pro-
ject has initial start-up costs and learning curves that make any
substitution of contractors an added expense. Furthermore, the
failure of the contractor to perform nearly always involves addi-
tional, substantial transactional costs such as locating a substitute
contractor, determining the scope of the remaining work, and en-
tering into contracts to perform the remaining work. For these rea-
1226 [Vol. 34:1225
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sons, as well as others, the success of the initial contractor is of
crucial importance.
The construction process has sometimes been compared to war-
fare. Not only does construction require the mobilization of per-
sonnel and materials, but there often is antagonism among the par-
ties on a project arising from their respective roles. The ideologies
of the owner, general contractor, subcontractor, and architect are
often different-and often at odds.
The focus of the antagonism among the parties naturally relates
to payment. Who gets the money on the project? Construction fi-
nancing is a highly specialized area of finance, with rules and pro-
cedures adapted to the risk and nature of the business.2 A simplis-
tic view of how money flows on a construction project and the
resultant attitudes of the parties might yield the following analysis:
first, the owner hires an architect to determine the scope and de-
sign of the project, sets a budget in accordance with the plans, and
then opens the project to competitive bidding-his goal is to
achieve the best building for the least money;3 second, the general
contractor who wants the job must submit the lowest bid-for it to
make a profit, however, the general contractor must do the least
work for the most money; third, in preparing its bid, the general
contractor may have obtained bids from subcontractors for sub-
stantial portions of the work-the general contractor seeks the
most work for the least money, while the subcontractor, like the
general contractor, wants to do the least work for the most money.
This process also affects the relationships among other players in
the construction "food chain," such as suppliers and laborers.
The foregoing describes a fixed-price contract with a designed
scope. There are many construction arrangements-design-build,4
2. See JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUC-
TION PROCESS §§ 12.01-.04 (4th ed. 1989) (describing generally the financing complexities
particular to construction, and how these problems are typically addressed by lenders in
public and private projects).
3. This describes the traditional construction process, with separation of design and con-
struction functions. Id. § 21.03, at 375-77.
4. In this arrangement, the designer is also primarily responsible for carrying out the con-
struction, combining the duties of designer and prime contractor into one entity. See id.
§ 21.04(F), at 387-89.
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engineer-procure-construct,5 and turnkey projects 6-that deter-
mine the scope of the contractor's obligations. In addition, the par-
ties on a project might utilize numerous contractual provisions to
shift the risks on the project. For instance, the parties might at-
tempt to place the risks of insolvency or nonpayment, design de-
fects, or warranties on the parties lower in the chain.
The construction contract surety, through its bond, might agree
to perform or pay the obligation of the contractors or subcontrac-
tors on a project. Even this simple description of the contract-for-
mation process demonstrates the obvious utility of having a surety
secure performance and payment obligations of the parties on the
project. The risky nature of the enterprise creates the need for
some guaranty that the construction job will be completed and
paid for.
When the obligation secured by the surety is the performance of
a construction contract, the full implications of the tripartite
surety relationship emerge. If the creditor or obligee is a note-
holder, it is fairly simple to determine whether there is an impair-
ment of collateral' or a modification of the underlying obligation"
giving rise to a suretyship defense. When the obligee is an owner
administering a construction project, however, the obligee can take
any number of actions that might interfere with or impair the
principal's performance, making such determination more difficult.
On a construction project, the obligee can commit innumerable ac-
tions that also interfere with the surety's options. Moreover, the
surety looks to the prospect of its own performance of the underly-
ing obligation as a means of reducing its risk or loss in the event
the principal fails to perform.9 In contrast to an obligee, who has
5. In this arrangement, the designing professional organization oversees the work of the
contractor(s) to promote efficiency and compliance with the design, but does not provide the
construction services. This function, called construction management, may also be per-
formed by a construction manager retained in addition to the design professional. Id.
§ 21.04(D), at 384-87.
6. Essentially a variation on a design-build contract, this arrangement provides one devel-
oper complete authority to design and build, with little or no oversight by the owner until
the project is complete and turned over to the owner. Id. § 21.04(E), at 387.
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 38 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
8. See id. § 37.
9. In National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir.
1969), the court described the surety:"
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CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT SURETY
substantial duties to return performance under a construction con-
tract, an obligee or creditor who is the holder of a note or other
obligation to pay has no duties.
A discussion of some of the decisions addressing suretyship de-
fenses in the context of construction contracts will reveal inconsis-
tency on the part of the courts in recognizing these rights and un-
certainty regarding the source of the substantive law. Although
much of this uncertainty is a product of varied state law, addi-
tional uncertainty stems from the evolution of the underlying
surety law. Most of the substantive principles that the courts
struggle to apply to construction sureties evolved in connection
with very different underlying obligations, such as negotiable in-
struments and guaranties of payment obligations. Articulating
rules that treat all suretyship obligations consistently, while also
recognizing the economic implications of the different underlying
obligations bonded by sureties, is one of the challenges facing the
drafters of the new Restatement of Suretyship.
II. CONTRACT SURETIES AND INSURANCE
10
For the most part, insurance companies underwrite surety bonds
in exchange for a premium. Unlike insurance policies, however, the
bond forms are not drafted unilaterally by the surety or the surety
industry. Many of the forms are created by the American Institute
of Architects (AIA)I" or promulgated by private or public owners,
This unique accumulation of subrogation rights serves to induce a function
that is neither ordinary insurance nor ordinary financing. The business of a
construction contract surety is not one of ordinary insurance, for the risk is not
actuarially linked to premiums, nor is there a pooling of risks.. . . In this her-
maphroditic situation, the "security" for the surety is not the fee but a com-
pound of its confidence in the contractor and the opportunity to prevent or
minimize its ultimate loss by its right to salvage the debacle by its own
performance.
Id. at 845.
10. The discussion in this section is drawn largely from a work prepared by the author.
See T. Scott Leo, Traditional Insurance Concepts and Surety Law, BRIEF, Spring 1992, at
52.
11. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A311, PERFORMANCE
BOND AND LABOR AND MATERIAL PAYMENT BOND (1970) [hereinafter AIA DOCUMENT A311],
reprinted in SWEET, supra note 2, app. D at 826; AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, AIA
DOCUMENT A312, PERFORMANCE BOND AND PAYMENT BOND (1984) [hereinafter AIA DocU-
MENT A312], reprinted in SWEET, supra note 3, app. D at 830.
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the obligees.12 In some instances, the obligee prepares the language
of the bond entirely, leaving the surety with no choice but to ac-
12. When the intent of the instrument is to provide indemnity coverage for particular
types of losses, "bonds" are sometimes treated as insurance policies. The following discus-
sion elaborates on the many instruments described as bonds.
Financial guaranty bond sureties agree to secure the obligation of a principal to pay the
obligee or creditor.
Performance bonds secure obligations of the principal to the obligee to perform obliga-
tions other than the payment of money. Some bonds require the surety to complete the
obligation upon default of the principal. As discussed above, many obligees prepare the
bond forms that they require sureties to execute. Some private obligees require "completion
bonds" providing that the surety's only option is to complete the underlying obligation. In
addition, courts have interpreted some public works statutes as requiring the surety to com-
plete the obligation after the principal's default. See, e.g., Coast Elec. Co. v. Industrial In-
dem. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 74, 75 (1983) (noting that a surety on a payment bond for a public
works project, entered into pursuant to the California Civil Code, was obligated upon de-
fault by the contractor to pay all sums due plus reasonable attorney fees); see also Trane
Co. v. Whitehurst-Lassen Constr. Co., 881 F.2d 996, 1005 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding, when
faced with a suit against a surety after the contractor's failure to perform, that "[t]he Miller
Act, and the Alabama Public Works statute, place a sometimes heavy burden of care on
general contractors and their sureties"). Other bonds, including the American Institute of
Architects bond forms A311 and A312, see supra note 11, preserve certain options for the
surety in curing the default of the principal. For example, the A312 bond form, which came
into use in 1985, specifically reserves the surety's option to do nothing and leave the comple-
tion of the obligation-usually a construction project-in the hands of the obligee. AMERI-
CAN BAR ASS'N, BOND DEFAULT MANUAL 160 (Richard S. Wisner ed., 1987) [hereinafter BOND
DEFAULT MANUAL]; see AIA DOCUMENT A312, supra note 11, S 4.4.2, reprinted in SWEET,
supra note 2, app. D at 831. The traditional options of the surety include: 1) takeover of the
project by the surety; 2) tender of a new contractor by the surety; 3) financing of the princi-
pal's completion of the work; or 4) payment of the amount required for completion of the
obligation up to the penal sum of the bond. BOND DEFAULT MANUAL, supra, at 161-62; see
AIA DOCUMENT A312, supra note 11, 4.4, reprinted in SWEET, supra note 2, app. D at 831.
For a more detailed discussion of these options, see BOND DEFAULT MANUAL, supra, at 159-
78.
Payment bonds secure the obligation of the principal to pay parties, other than the obli-
gee, who furnish labor and materials to the principal to enable the performance of the un-
derlying obligation. Typical payment bonds cover the obligation to pay parties having "just
claims" for material and labor provided to the principal and do not contemplate that the
obligee will be a payment bond claimant.
Other forms of contract surety bonds may include fiduciary and other obligations, includ-
ing court bonds, trustee bonds, and public official bonds. These types of "miscellaneous"
bonds are discussed elsewhere in this Symposium. See James A. Black, Jr., Miscellaneous
Surety Bonds and the Restatement, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1195 (1993). Trustee bonds and
public official bonds cover the obligations of the official or trustee to perform faithfully the
duties of the office. See EDWARD W. SPENCER, THE GENERAL LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 258, at
362 (1913). When an instrument provides for blanket coverage, applying to the duties of a
number of officials who may or may not know of the existence of the bond, it may be con-
strued as an insurance policy as opposed to a suretyship instrument. See, e.g., Kinzer v.
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cept the obligee's bond form or decline to execute the bond. None-
theless, surety bonds often are construed as insurance policies.
When the language is ambiguous, the bond will be construed most
strongly against the insurance company writing the bond.13 Some
courts have expanded this rule of construction to justify the appli-
cation of substantive insurance law to surety bonds and the surety
relationship. 4
Unlike an indemnity insurer, a contract surety does not agree to
bear any risks for its principal. The purpose of the surety relation-
ship is to provide another party to which the obligee can look for
performance of the underlying obligation should the principal fail
to perform. Because the principal always remains liable to perform
the underlying obligation, the surety's liability to the obligee is co-
extensive with that of the principal as provided in the bond. Bonds
ordinarily contain a penal amount that serves as a limit on the
surety's liability. The principal, who under the contract may have
an obligation to perform no matter what the cost, receives no pro-
tection from the bond's penal amount. The principal's liability
therefore extends beyond that of the surety.15
Some courts have confused suretyship with insurance by mistak-
ing the obligation of the surety as an obligation to hold harmless
the principal. 6 The surety has no such obligation. To the contrary,
the principal must exonerate 7 and reimburse' 8 the surety. Unlike
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 572 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the nature
of a blanket public official bond did not create a suretyship instrument).
13. See, e.g., Associates Fin. Servs. Co. v. Eisenberg, 186 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Wis. 1971)
(indicating that when a surety contract is executed for a premium or other consideration,
the general rule that ambiguities are resolved in favor of the surety is inapplicable).
14. See, e.g., Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Med. Ctr. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp.
1344, 1345-46 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying substantive insurance law in determining the liabil-
ity of a surety); see also Leo, supra note 10, at 53-56 (discussing the misapplication of insur-
ance law in the surety context).
15. For cases distinguishing a contract surety obligation from insurance, see, e.g., Schmitt
v. Insurance Co., 281 Cal. Rptr. 261, 267-68 (Ct. App. 1991); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.
v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 546, 550 (Ct. App. 1982); Meyer v. Building &
Realty Serv. Co., 196 N.E. 250, 253-54 (Ind. 1935); Garco Indus. Equip. Co. v. Mallory, 485
N.E.2d 652, 654 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
16. See, e.g., Rush Presbyterian, 712 F. Supp. at 1345-46.
17. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY7§ 112 (1941).
18. Id. § 104.
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insurance, a contract surety obligation is not an aleatory contract. 19
The contract surety does not underwrite a contractor based on
some actuarial determination of the risk for the appropriate pre-
mium. Instead, contract bonds, like loans, are written based on the
financial integrity of the principal, premised on the idea that no
losses should follow.20
In attempting to grapple with suretyship principles, courts some-
times confuse the principles of construction with substantive prin-
ciples of law by treating surety bonds as insurance policies. 1 In
some jurisdictions where both surety bonds and insurance policies
are strictly construed, different substantive principles apply to
suretyship obligations.22
19. An aleatory contract is "[a] mutual agreement, of which the effects, with respect both
to the advantages and losses, whether to all the parties or to some of them, depend on an
uncertain event." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 70 (6th ed. 1990) (citing RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 291 (1932)).
20. This difference becomes apparent in the context of the principal's bankruptcy, in
which case courts often treat contract surety bonds as financial accommodations rather than
executory contracts subject to assumption or insurance policies. See, e.g., In re Wegner
Farms Co., 49 B.R. 440, 443-44 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985). For treatment of financial accom-
modations in bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1988). See also In re Adana Mortgage
Bankers, Inc., 12 B.R. 977, 986-87 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (applying and defining "financial
accommodations"); In re Johnson Constr., Inc., Bankruptcy No. 89-05397, slip op. at 5
(D.N.D. June 19, 1989) (citing In re Wegner Farms and In re Adana) (finding that payment
and performance bonds are financial accommodations and are not assumable by the debtor).
21. See, e.g., Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Med. Ctr. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp.
1344, 1345-46 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (equating the surety's failing to settle a case with that of the
insurer).
22. For example, in Meyer v. Building & Realty Service Co., 196 N.E. 250 (Ind. 1935), the
court observed:
While insurance contracts are in many respects similar to surety contracts, yet
there is a very wide difference between the two kinds of contracts. Insurance
has been defined as a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another
against loss, damage, or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event;
whereas a contract of suretyship is one to answer for the debt, default, or mis-
carriage of another, and a contract of suretyship is not altered because made
by a corporation for compensation. Notwithstanding the fact, surety contracts,
when executed by a corporation for compensation has sometimes been spoken
of by the courts as insurance contracts, the fact still remains that the wide
difference, above mentioned, still exists.
Id. at 253-54.
Similarly, the court in Garco Industrial Equipment Co. v. Mallory, 485 N.E.2d 652 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1985), drew the following distinctions:
There are, however, definite differences between insurance contracts and
surety contracts. First a contractor does not purchase a performance or pay-
1232
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The surety's obligation arises upon the principal's default on the
underlying obligation. The surety possesses the duty to cure the
default. Default may also have consequences for the surety in at-
tempting to enforce its rights against the principal. The surety
may have no rights against its principal until the principal de-
faults. Some courts have expanded this rule to support the view
that the surety has no right to collateral or property (such as con-
tract funds) held to secure the performance of the obligation until
the principal actually defaults.23 A majority of courts find that the
surety's rights in such collateral relate back to the time of the exe-
cution of the bond.24 At least one court observed, however, that the
surety's subrogation right prior to default remains a "shadowy
thing. '25
III. THE SURETY'S EQUITABLE RIGHTS IN CONTRACT FUNDS
The surety, by virtue of its status, possesses equitable rights to
contract funds due the principal. The recognition of these rights
has been a source of frustration to those representing secured lend-
ers in attempting to recover receivables due contractors/principals.
Most of the litigation over the surety's rights to contract funds in-
volves disputes with those claiming an interest in those funds by
virtue of a security interest in receivables.26
ment bond to protect himself from loss. Second, a suretyship involves a third
party, the contractor as principal, which creates a basic difference from insur-
ance contracts. Third, the premium on a surety bond is usually paid by the
principal although the obligee is the party receiving the protection of the bond.
While insurance contracts and suretyships are often viewed as similar, these
differences necessitate caution in applying the rules of insurance.
Id. at 654 n.1.
23. E.g., Kansas City v. Tri-City Constr. Co., 666 F. Supp. 170, 172 (W.D. Mo. 1987); see
also In re Bagwell Coatings, Inc., 34 B.R. 193, 196 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1983) (explaining that
subrogation arises only when a claim has been made).
24. E.g., Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 834, 837 (Ct. Cl. 1968)); Gray v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 280 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding that the subrogation rights of a surety
upon default by a principal are deemed to have accrued as of the time the bond was exe-
cuted); National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 45, 48 (N.D. Ala. 1970); see SPEN-
c ER, supra note 12, § 136, at 181.
25. American Fidelity Co. v. National City Bank, 266 F.2d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
26. See, e.g., In re Ward Land Clearing & Drainage, Inc., 73 B.R. 313, 314 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 1987) (involving a claim by a surety to the contract funds held in escrow, following
default by the contractor and completion of performance by the surety); City Bank & Trust
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Allowing the surety a prior and superior interest in earned con-
tract funds furthers the policy of ensuring completion of the work
and payment of the parties furnishing supplies and executing the
work. The surety's interest is typically found to be prior and supe-
rior to that of the parties claiming an interest in the contractor/
principal's receivables because the surety is subrogated to the obli-
gee/creditor's rights to the contract funds.2 7 Courts finding that the
surety did not have a superior or prior interest in the contract
funds due its principal commonly have advanced the following rea-
sons for their decisions: 1) the event required for the surety's
rights to "vest" in the contract funds did not occur;28 2) the
surety's equitable interest did not relate back to the date of the
execution of the bond;29 3) procedurally, there was some impedi-
ment to the surety's attempt to enforce its equitable rights; 30 or 4)
the surety failed to record its interest under Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.31
Co. v. Don's Elec., Inc. (In re Don's Elec., Inc.) 65 B.R. 399, 401 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986)
(involving a lender's claim to the receivables of a contractor pursuant to a security agree-
ment, following the contractor's filing of a bankruptcy petition).
27. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 141 cmt. c (1941); BOND DEFAULT MANUAL, supra note
12, at 73 (citing Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962)).
28. For example, the required default may not have occurred. See International Fidelity
Ins. Co. v. United States, 949 F.2d 1042 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the IRS had priority
over the surety on liens filed before the default and that the surety had priority over the
IRS liens filed after the default); In re Bagwell Coatings, Inc., 34 B.R. 193, 196 (Bankr. M.D.
La. 1983).
29. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders, Inc. (In re Universal Builders, Inc.), 53 B.R.
183, 186 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985). State law may also affect the priority of the surety. See
In re V. Pangori & Sons, Inc., 53 B.R. 711 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (finding that an inter-
vening judicial lien creditor under Michigan law possessed a superior right to contract funds
and holding that bankruptcy courts must analyze parties' rights by applying state law).
30. See, e.g., American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 623 F. Supp. 722 (W.D.
Tenn. 1985) (holding that a failure to challenge an IRS levy on contract funds within the
nine-month statutory limitation served as an obstacle to enforcing the surety's rights).
31. Initially, the U.C.C. Editorial Board proposed a subsection (7) to Article 9-312 that
would have provided that a security interest that secured an obligation to reimburse a
surety would be subordinate to a lender that later perfected a security interest in the prop-
erty. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT 773-74, 777 (text and comments ed.
1952). After a meeting with surety representatives in 1953, the Editorial Board rejected that
version of subsection (7). See UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
CHANGES IN THE TEXT AND COMMENTS 25-26 (1953). Extensive discussion of the rejection of
this subsection by the Editorial Board appears in National Shawmut Bank v. New Amster-
dam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843, 846 (1st Cir. 1969).
1234
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Those decisions requiring that a technical default of the princi-
pal's contract occur before the surety's equitable rights vest in the
contract funds tend to elevate form over substance. This question
is especially troubling in the context of the principal/contractor's
bankruptcy, in which case the surety might seek some control over
the use of contract funds to insure that the principal completes the
work and pays the parties furnishing labor and materials.32 The
surety's inchoate lien in the funds ought to be protected in order
to insure that the project is finished and the parties are paid.33
Some cases suggest that by executing an indemnity agreement with the principal, the
surety is electing to pursue legal rights that must be recorded, as opposed to equitable rights
that are not subject to recordation requirements. See Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Med.
Ctr. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp. 1344, 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (refusing to enforce equitable
rights of the surety against the contractor because of explicit rights under the contract).
32. In some cases, the courts treat the surety's rights in progress payments and retainage
differently. Some courts hold that an Article 9 secured party's or other lienor's interest in
progress payments can attach prior to that of the surety because those funds were actually
due the principal before the default. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. United States,
304 F.2d 465, 467 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (holding that a surety has no claim to progress payments
made to an assignee of the contractor prior to a default by the contractor); Bank of Ariz. v.
National Sur. Corp., 237 F.2d 90, 94 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding that a paying surety could not
recover progress payments made by the owner to an assignee bank prior to the contractor's
default and where the assignee bank was not put on notice of the surety's interest). Like the
requirement that there be a default, the distinction between progress payments and
retainage is not uniformly recognized. Some cases recognize the surety's priority to progress
payments. See, e.g., In re Ward Land Clearing & Drainage, Inc., 73 B.R. 313 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 1987) (upholding the surety's priority); Tri-city Serv. Dist. v. Pacific Marine Dredging
& Constr. (In re Pacific Marine Dredging & Constr.), 79 B.R. 924 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987)
(recognizing the surety's rights in funds). Other decisions, especially in the context of the
principal's bankruptcy, treat the surety's interest in progress payments and retainage differ-
ently. See, e.g., American States Ins. Co. v. Glover Constr. Co. (In re Glover Constr. Co.), 30
B.R. 873 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (recognizing the debtor's interest in the funds under 11
U.S.C. § 541, but allowing the surety joint control and requiring payment to satisfy bonded
payables on assumed projects first). At least two courts have attempted to reconcile these
differences, noting that the distinction between retainage and progress payments is actually
illusory, see Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1985), but that
courts have often discussed the surety's rights to retainage exclusive of any discussion of
progress payments because retainage was all that was available to the surety at the time of
trial. See National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 45, 49 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
33. In one article examining the surety's lien on funds in the context of the principal's
Chapter 11 proceeding, the authors noted:
Whether you characterize [the surety's] interest as one of ownership, a lien or
a priority, the result is the same. The debtor's interest, whatever it is, requires
that contract funds, earned or unearned, be used to complete the contract
before such funds can be used by the debtor for other purposes. In other
words, while it might be argued that the estate has a property interest, that
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Some bankruptcy cases concede the value of the surety's lien by
applying the contemporaneous exchange preference exception and
finding prepetition payments that benefit a surety before default
to be contemporaneous exchanges for value. 4
As noted above, the surety's equitable interest is not subject to
the requirements of Article 9 of the Uniform. Commercial Code. 5
As a general rule, because the surety asserts its rights to contract
funds as the subrogee of the obligee's or creditor's rights to the
funds, there is no receivable due the principal, and thus, there is
no receivable to which a secured interest can attach.3 6 The surety's
interest in contract funds is therefore not a security interest sub-
ject to the strictures of Article 9.
The 1947 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Munsey
Trust Co. 37 cast into doubt the surety's ability to utilize contract
funds on federal projects by holding that the obligee, the United
States, could assert its right to set off contract funds remaining to
satisfy a nonmutual obligation of the principal.3 8 The reasoning of
interest is subject to the interest of the owner and the laborers and material-
men to have the funds used to complete the project and pay the costs thereof.
William F. Haug & Janis M. Haug, Bankruptcy 1984 vs. the Surety's Right to Contract
Proceeds, 20 FORUM 725, 736 (1985).
34. Newbery Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 106 B.R. 186 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989) (rec-
ognizing the release of a surety's equitable lien as a contemporaneous exchange for value);
O'Rourke v. Coral Constr., Inc. (In re Fegert), 88 B.R. 258 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988), af'd, 887
F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1989).
35. National Shawmut, 411 F.2d at 849 (holding that a surety's interest is not a security
interest and is not subject to recordation requirements: "equitable subrogation is too hardy
a plant to be uprooted by a Code which speaks around but not to the issue"); In re Eastern
Marine, Inc., 104 B.R. 421 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that a surety's right to equitable
subrogation is not subject to U.C.C. filing requirements but that an equitable right applies
only to an interest in bonded projects); Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 206 A.2d 49 (Pa. 1965)
(holding that surety interest is not a security interest).
36. In Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136-42 (1962), the Court dis-
cussed how the surety might be subrogated not only to the rights of the obligee, but to the
rights of the principal/contractor and the payment claimants it pays.
37. 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
38. Id. at 244. The government resisted paying contract funds to a surety that met its
payment obligations, asserting a right to set off contract funds on the bonded project to
satisfy the principal's obligations to the government on other nonbonded contracts. Id. at
237.
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the Munsey Trust decision has received some criticism. 3 Munsey
Trust gave rise to an irrational distinction between the circum-
stances in which the surety satisfies a payment obligation and the
government can set off nonmutual obligations, and those in which
the surety satisfies a performance obligation and the government
cannot set off nonmutual obligations. By allowing set-off for unre-
lated obligations, Munsey Trust increased the risk to the surety.40
The obligee's set-off rights, the surety's right to use contract
funds, and the priority of the surety's right to these funds are is-
sues that arise primarily in connection with construction contract
sureties. The rights of the surety to use contract funds to defray
the risk of nonperformance by the principal, and to undertake per-
formance in the event of the principal's default, are the rights that
the obligee might impair or modify by some action or inaction. The
policy favoring protecting the surety from such obligee inaction or
action is the avoidance of economic waste. The surety, however, is
not a garden-variety secured creditor looking to recover ordinary
collateral. Moreover, in the complicated series of actions and rela-
tionships that arise during the course of a construction project, de-
termining the impact of the obligee/creditor's conduct on the
surety's rights is difficult.
39. See Daniel Mungall, Jr., The Buffeting of the Subrogation Rights of the Construction
Contract Bond Surety by United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 46 INs. COUNSEL J. 607 (1979).
Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's later decision in Pearlman, the holding of Mun-
sey Trust is now limited.
40. In two decisions near the turn of the century, the Supreme Court did recognize the
surety's equitable rights to contract proceeds. See Henningsen v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404, 411 (1908); Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 240
(1896). The Court in Henningsen found that a payment bond surety had a right to contract
funds despite the claim of an assignee bank to those funds, noting that the payment by the
surety released the government's equitable obligations to insure that laborers and material-
men were paid. Henningsen, 208 U.S. at 410-11. In Prairie State, the Court held that a
performing surety had a right superior to the bank to whom the contractor assigned the
right to final payment, the surety having stepped into the shoes of the government to use
the funds for the completion of the work. Prairie State, 164 U.S. at 232, 240. However, the
primary Supreme Court cases relating to surety's rights-Munsey Trust and Pearlman-are
more recent, postdating the original Restatement of Security, which was published in 1941.
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IV. OBLIGEE'S DUTIES TO THE SURETY-IMPAIRMENT OF THE
CONTRACT SURETY'S COLLATERAL AND MODIFICATION
OF THE UNDERLYING OBLIGATION
Construction, as discussed, involves the interaction of many par-
ties over time in the performance of a number of tasks. For exam-
ple, the architect often acts as the agent of the owner on the pro-
ject and thus may be charged with certain duties, such as cer-
tification of payments due the contractors and subcontractors.
Furthermore, during the course of construction, any number of
acts or omissions on the part of the owner might affect the pros-
pects for successful completion of the work.
Therefore, construction contracts typically involve progress pay-
ments-payments released to the contractor in accordance with
the certified state of completion. This payment system adds incen-
tive for the contractor to complete the work and reduces the risk of
nonperformance for the owner. A percentage of funds held until
completion of all of the work is called retainage and is intended
both to reduce the risk of nonperformance by the contractor and to
assure the completion of the work in accordance with the contract
terms.
Sureties rely on the underlying contract terms in underwriting
bonds. Progress payment and retainage serve to reduce the
surety's, as well as the owner's, risk. A surety facing a demand for
performance after a declaration of default by the owner may find
that the amount of the contract funds remaining unpaid at the
time of the declaration of default falls far below the amount re-
quired for completion of the work. This may be because the owner
or obligee has either knowingly or inadvertently paid the contrac-
tor more than the amount of compensation to which it was entitled
based on the percentage of completion.
Sureties have attempted to assert affirmative claims against
owner/obligees who, by violating the payment terms of construc-
tion contracts, have increased the surety's exposure from the prin-
cipal's nonperformance.4 The difficulty for sureties asserting these
41. See, e.g., American Casualty Co. v. Board of Educ., 228 F. Supp. 843, 846 (W.D. Okla.
1964) (involving a surety's claim against an owner on the ground that the owner's release of
10% retainage to the principal prior to the principal's completion of the work subjected the
surety to excessive postdefault loss).
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claims is that the rules as stated in the Restatement of Security do
not offer clear support for such claims.2 Sureties argue that owner
violations of the payment terms resulting in overpayments to the
42. Sections 128 and 132 of the Restatement of Security, dealing with material modifica-
tions and impairment of collateral, respectively, address suretyship defenses and not affirm-
ative claims by the surety to recover contract funds wasted because of a breach by the
obligee of its duties. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 128, 132 (1941). Frequently, the
construction contract surety will discover a premature payment defense only after it has
paid for the completion of work that the principal has left unfinished. Courts are reluctant
to allow such claims after payment. E.g., Firemans's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 909
F.2d 495, 499 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In some cases, the surety must show that the obligee paid for
unperformed work and that it did so absent a good faith belief that the principal would
complete the balance of the work. E.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. City of Kennewick, 785
F.2d 660, 662 (9th Cir. 1986). The obligee can rely on the certifications made by the design
professional. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Town of Cloverdale, 699 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983).
Presumably, such a rule would not harm the surety that can later, after payment, assert a
subrogation claim against the architect for improper certification.
On the question of a surety asserting an affirmative claim based on the obligee's release of
contract funds, § 33(4) of the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship would now appear to
allow such recovery when the surety performs the balance of the work under business com-
pulsion and without knowledge that the obligee prematurely paid the principal. Subsection
33(4) states:
(4) If the obligee impairs the recourse of the secondary obligor against the
principal obligor
(a) after the secondary obligor performs any portion of the secondary
obligation; or
(b) before the secondary obligor performs a portion of the secondary
obligation, if the secondary obligor performs:
(i) withoutknowledge of such act;
(ii) for the benefit of an intended beneficiary who can enforce the
secondary obligation notwithstanding the impairment of recourse; or
(iii) under business compulsion; then, the secondary obligor has a
claim against the obligee with respect to any portion of the secondary
obligation that has been performed to the extent that such impairment
would have discharged the secondary obligor with respect to that
performance.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 33(4) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993). Unfortunately,
§ 33(4) discusses "impairment of recourse" without clearly stating that such recourse in-
cludes available contract funds. In fact, "recourse," a term borrowed from Article 3 of the
U.C.C., first appears in the Restatement in § 14 and § 33, but with little explanation. Sec-
tion 14 appears to describe recourse as all of the secondary obligor's rights against the prin-
cipal obligor-exoneration, reimbursement and subrogation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP § 14 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992). The problem with the use of the term "recourse"
is that it places special emphasis on the ability of the surety to recover from the principal.
And, although § 14(1) discusses the secondary obligor's rights to require the principal to
perform the underlying obligation, id. § 14(1), neither § 14 nor § 33 addresses the obliga-
tion of the obligee to return performance. Comment b to § 33 states that any act impairing
a principal obligor's performance and the secondary obligor's rights of reimbursement and
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principal and increased postdefault losses for the surety amount to
either impairment of collateral or material modification of the
contract.43
The obligee should refrain from conduct that reduces or elimi-
nates the incentive for the principal to perform the underlying ob-
ligation or that actually impairs the performance of that obliga-
tion. When the underlying obligation is the payment of money, the
obligee should avoid harming the surety through a release or modi-
fication of the principal's obligation. Because of the duty of the
obligee to return performance under a construction contract, there
is a vast range of conduct that might reduce or eliminate the in-
centive of the principal to complete the work, thereby increasing
the exposure of the surety.44 Courts only reluctantly allow the
surety to assert affirmative claims against obligees for this conduct,
partly because premature payment of contract funds or failure to
administer construction payments properly cannot be neatly de-
fined as an impairment of collateral or material modification of the
contract.45
subrogation impairs recourse. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 33 cmt. b (Tent. Draft
No. 2).
Another question raised by the language of this section is what constitutes business com-
pulsion. Is it the same standard as set forth in § 20 allowing a surety reimbursement from
the principal for payments under business compulsion? See id. § 20. Can the surety per-
form and reserve its right to recover from the obligee?
43. See Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1163-65 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (allowing
a surety's action against the government where the government made a progress payment to
the principal after the surety notified the government of the principal's default, because the
government must consider the surety's interest in its administration of contracts); United
States Fidelity & Guar..Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1377, 1384-85 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (consid-
ering the government's duty to consider possible harm to the surety in making progress
payments); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. United States, 434 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (involv-
ing a surety who argued that the government had a legal obligation to withhold payments
inconsistent with the surety's subrogation rights under the contract).
44. For example, unwarranted progress payments reduce the incentive of the principal to
complete its duties.
45. For recent cases involving a surety asserting an impairment of collateral or material
modification defense, or seeking recovery from the obligee for the improper disbursement of
contract funds, see Fireman's Fund, 909 F.2d at 495 (declining to apply an overpayment
defense on a federal contract); United States v. Reliance Ins. Co., 799 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir.
1986) (finding a material modification of the payment guaranty); Transamerica Insurance,
785 F.2d 660 (allowing the surety to recover payments made in the absence of good faith);
Argonaut Insurance, 699 F.2d 417 (holding that the obligee's good faith reliance on an engi-
neer's estimates rendered the defense of premature payment unavailable to the surety);
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V. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF SOME ARTICLE 3 PRINCIPLES
WITH CONTRACT SURETY OBLIGATIONS
During the course of construction, extensions and modifications
are routinely sought and granted. Because of the uncertainties of
the construction process, change orders may be frequent. Although
a change order is usually an immaterial change that is accommo-
dated by adjusting the contractor's compensation, the surety ex-
pects and is entitled to be notified of any material changes that
modify the underlying obligation.46 If the principal/contractor has
committed a material breach of the contract, then the obligee, if it
intends to assert a claim against the surety, should not continue to
pay the principal/contractor or allow it to perform without notify-
ing the surety.
Construction activities demand enormous transactional costs.
Kicking someone off a project for nonperformance will nearly al-
ways result in increased costs to virtually all of the parties. For
this and other reasons, the parties expect that the principal will
perform the obligation, and that the obligee has a right to demand
that the surety perform only in the event of a default by the prin-
cipal. Rules that will allow construction activity to proceed in a
sensible and economic fashion should: 1) allow for changes and
modifications that do not affect the fundamental agreement of the
parties; 2) prevent or discourage the obligee from committing eco-
nomic waste; and 3) recognize the value of the performance of the
Mergentime Corp. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 775 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1991)
(holding that a surety must show lack of knowledge of change in the contract and actual
prejudice).
When the surety has been harmed by the release of contract funds wrongfully certified by
the architect or engineer, the owner or obligee may be exonerated from liability through its
good faith reliance on the certification. Argonaut Insurance, 699 F.2d at 419. However, the
courts will allow sureties to recover from negligent design professionals. See Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472, 475 (8th Cir. 1968); Peerless Ins. Co.
v. Cerny & Assoc., 199 F. Supp. 951, 953-54 (D. Minn. 1961); Calandro Dev. v. R.M. Butler
Contractors, 249 So. 2d 254, 265 (La. Ct. App. 1971); State ex rel. National Sur. Corp. v.
Mulvaney, 72 So. 2d 424, 431 (Miss. 1954); Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 80-81 (Mo.
1967).
46. The bond forms utilized in the industry contemplate the prospect of change orders,
providing a waiver of notice of such changes: "The Surety hereby waives notice of any
change, including changes of time, to the Construction Contract or to related subcontracts,
purchase orders and other obligations." AIA DOCUMENT A312, supra note 11, 8 (Perform-
ance Bond), reprinted in SwEE'r, supra note 2, app. D at 831.
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principal who originally contracted to perform the work as well as
the option of the surety to reduce its loss through its own
performance.
The discharge, modification, and extension rules incorporated in
revised section 3-605 of the Uniform Commercial Code cannot be
readily adapted to apply to surety obligations involving perform-
ance of construction contracts. Subsection (b) provides that the re-
lease of the principal will not release the surety, and subsections
(c) and (d) provide that extensions can be a defense to the holder's
(obligee's) claim.4" These rules might encourage releases of princi-
pals in lieu of extensions and modifications. Although they en-
hance negotiability, when applied in the context of construction
contracts these rules could lead to unnecessary releases of parties
otherwise able to perform under extensions.
The rule in section 3-605(b)-that a release of a principal obligor
never discharges the secondary obligor 8-would lead to absurd ec-
onomic and practical consequences if applied to secondary per-
formance obligations in construction contracts. One of the reasons
stated for justifying this rule in Article 3 is that such a release is
47. Section 3-605 states in part:
(b) Discharge ... of the obligation of a party to pay an instrument does not
discharge the obligation of an indorser or accommodation party having a right
of recourse against the discharged party.
(c) If a person entitled to enforce an instrument agrees, with or without con-
sideration, to an extension of the due date of the obligation of a party to pay
the instrument, the extension discharges an indorser or accommodation party
having a right of recourse against the party whose obligation is extended to the
extent the indorser or accommodation party proves that the extension caused
loss to the indorser or accommodation party with respect to the right of
recourse.
(d) If a person entitled to enforce an instrument agrees, with or without con-
sideration, to a material modification of the obligation of a party other than an
extension of the due date, the modification discharges the obligation of an in-
dorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse against the person
whose obligation is modified to the extent the modification causes loss to the
indorser or accommodation party with respect to the right of recourse. The loss
suffered by the indorser or accommodation party as a result of the modifica-
tion is equal to the amount of the right of recourse unless the person enforcing
the instrument proves that no loss was caused by the modification or that the
loss caused by the modification was an amount less than the amount of the
right of recourse.
U.C.C. § 3-605(b)-(d) (1990).
48. Id. § 3-605(b).
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unlikely to harm the secondary obligor.49 In connection with nego-
tiable instruments, this might be an accurate observation. A surety
or secondary obligor knows from the instrument that payment is
expected and that it can pursue its rights to recourse from the
principal obligor in the event payment is demanded.
A construction surety, in contrast, has an expectation that the
principal will perform.5 0 The transactional costs involved in con-
struction give this expectation added significance. A release rule
allowing for the full reservation of rights of the creditor against the
secondary obligor of an obligation to pay might serve to reduce the
transactional costs. Moreover, it will cause no harm because of the
secondary obligor's rights of recourse against the principal obligor.
Replacing a principal/contractor on a construction project, how-
ever, nearly always results in additional costs. In addition, the
surety cannot rely on its right to recourse or reimbursement from a
contractor/principal that may be operating at the brink of insol-
vency. The most meaningful recourse for the construction bond
surety is often the least expensive arrangement for concluding the
work. As noted earlier, the construction contract surety has an in-
terest in the performance of the work.
49. Id. § 3-605 cmt. 3.
50. Both the Restatement of Security and the tentative draft of the Restatement (Third)
of Suretyship, in defining suretyship, state that the principal is primarily obligated to per-
form. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 (1941) ("[A]s between the two who are bound, one
rather than the other should perform . . . ."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP
§ 1(1)(d) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992) ("[A]s between the principal obligor and the secondary
obligor, the principal obligor has a duty to perform the underlying obligation or bear the
cost of performance.").
Although the expectation that the principal will perform is reflected in the Restatement
definitions, there is no explicit requirement that the principal be in actual default before a
demand is placed upon the surety. Cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing
cases requiring default). Construction contracts and bonds often contain detailed provisions
dealing with what constitutes a default, the procedures for declaring a default and terminat-
ing the contractor, and the consequences of a termination. Construction bonds indicate by
their terms that an event of default must occur before a demand can be made to the surety
to perform. A defeasance clause in a current form bond states: "If the Contractor performs
the Construction Contract, the Surety and the Contractor shall have no obligation under
this Bond . . . ." AIA DOCUMENT A312, supra note 11, 2 (Performance Bond), reprinted
in SWEET, supra note 2, app. D at 831. That form bond also provides for specific options in
the event the principal's contract is terminated. Id. 3.2, 4-6, reprinted in SWEET, supra
note 2, app. D at 831.
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In the world of construction contracts, the release rule in Article
3 makes no sense. Without an act of default on the part of the
principal, it would be absurd for an obligee to release the princi-
pal/contractor and make demand upon the surety to pay for or to
prosecute the balance of the work.' Good sense requires rules in
the construction world that directly contradict the rules of the
Uniform Commercial Code. In order for construction to proceed
and for the principal to prosecute the work successfully, some
mechanism for granting extensions and immaterial modifications
during the work, while preserving the basic bargain of the parties,
must be available. As noted, terms relating to immaterial changes
are often provided in the contract or bond.52 Given the transac-
tional costs for substituted performance, absent a default on the
part of the principal, a release of the principal presumably should
release the surety.
The Restatement of Security does not emphasize the impor-
tance of performance by the principal or surety as a means of
avoiding loss. 53 For the performance bond surety, the capacity or
51. The Restatement of Security provides:
Where the creditor releases a principal, the surety is discharged, unless
(a) the surety consents to remain liable notwithstanding the release, or
(b) the creditor in the release reserves his rights against the surety.
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 122.
The reservation-of-rights rule of subparagraph (b) does not appear to have much applica-
tion in the world of construction contracts, although some court decisions discuss such res-
ervations by payment claimants. See, e.g., Griffin Wellpoint Corp. v. Engelhardt, Inc., 414
N.E.2d 941, 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that an extension of time for payment on a
contract will not release a surety from his obligations if the creditor expressly reserves his
rights against the surety). I could not find, however, a single case involving release by an
obligee of a principal with a reservation of rights to proceed against the surety on a con-
struction contract.
52. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
53. The Restatement of Security sections relating to release, impairment, and modifica-
tion use language and draw upon illustrations involving, for the most part, payment obliga-
tions. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 122, 127-128, 130, 132. The drafters of the Restate-
ment noted some problems in the application of the principles to construction obligations:
The rules stated in Clause (b) find important application in the case of
building contracts. The modifications of contract between creditor and princi-
pal may be such as are contemplated by the contract in which case no surety
would be discharged. They may be slight variations which by the technical
rules which have prevailed in respect to non-compensated sureties would dis-
charge them, although not in fact disadvantageous to the surety. In such a case
the compensated surety would not be discharged. They may cause slight and
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ability of the principal to perform the work is security like any
other collateral. To address this situation, the Restatement of
Suretyship might describe the affirmative duties of the obligee or
deal with impairment of performance. In addition, the rules allo-
cating the burdens of proof and persuasion should recognize the
difficulty for the construction contract surety to prove prejudice
resulting from a release of the principal, modification of the con-
tract, or impairment of collateral. 4
The premature payment defense provides a natural focus for a
discussion of suretyship defenses and the construction contract
surety. This issue concerns sureties who face both increased expo-
sure from the improper administration of payments on projects,
and court decisions that reflect a great deal of uncertainty over the
substantive law that applies. Ironically, although court decisions in
general infrequently cite the Restatement of Security, the court
decisions on the premature payment defense tend to refer to it as
authority.5
easily measured damage to the compensated surety, so that the penalty of a
total discharge of the surety would be disproportionate to the blame attaching
to the creditor for the modification. In such a case the surety is discharged only
to the extent of the loss. The compensated surety, however, should not be held
to his obligation if the creditor and principal have so modified the contract as
to impose a risk of loss substantially different from the one covered by his
obligation. If the change imposes a danger of loss upon the surety which can-
not fairly be measured, the surety is discharged entirely.
Id. § 128 cmt. f. Following the commentary, the Restatement of Security recognizes the
problem of assessing the extent of prejudice to the surety in connection with modifications
of construction contracts and suggests that the burden of proving discharge ought to shift if
the risk cannot be determined fairly. Id. illus. 8-9. The Restatement of Security does not
address these problems in a black letter rule, however.
54. Some rules to this effect have been proposed recently. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURrYsHIP §§ 35, 37-38 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993). Courts have struggled with how to allo-
cate the burden of proof in premature payment cases. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Colbert,
365 F.2d 530, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that the obligee must notify the surety in the
event of a substantial change in the contract); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 15
CL. Ct. 225, 230 (1988) (holding that a surety is released from its obligations because of
changes in the payment provisions of a contract only to the extent that the surety can show
the modifications caused injury, loss, or prejudice), rev'd on other grounds, 909 F.2d 495
(Fed. Cir. 1990); Gibbs v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 So. 2d 599, 604 (Fla. 1952)
(holding that the surety had the burden of proving that delinquencies or misconduct re-
sulted in damage to the surety and that the surety must prove the extent of the damage).
55. See, e.g., Reliance Insurance, 365 F.2d at 535 n.5 (citing RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY
§ 128 cmt. f, at 344-46).
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The Restatement of Suretyship should enunciate principles that
apply to suretyship obligations while recognizing the practical dif-
ferences between types of obligations. In the case of the construc-
tion contract surety, adopting principles from the Uniform Com-
mercial Code may not be logical or useful. This does not mean that
the performance bond surety needs a separate set of rules, but that
the rules should reflect the crucial importance of the performance
of the underlying obligation and the practical impact of the trans-
actional costs.
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